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CASE NOTES
relies on the statement in the Schenck case to the effect that there is no
responsibility if the service was rendered in good faith, without clear
evidence of culpable negligence or wilful misconduct. The court then
went on to say that it was apparent that reasonable judgment and skill
xAere being exercised since no testimony of any culpability or wilfulness
was given. The Kern case does not evidence adherence to a gross negli-
gence rule because the explanations of both ordinary negligence and
gross negligence were inserted merely for the purpose of showing that
neither was present.
In conclusion, it appears that the United States should be held liable
for the negligence of the Coast Guard in the course of a sea rescue, and
that the standard of care to be imposed should be that of reasonable care.
Although this would seem to be placing an undue burden on the gov-
ernment since the duty to rescue is not one imposed by law but assumed
voluntarily, the fact remains that there is a federal statute making all
government vessels liable for negligence. Until this statute is amended or
repealed, the court is duty-bound to apply it, and since the statute is
unambiguous, it would seem that this court, in saying that the legislature
did not intend to include vessels used in rescue operations, has usurped
its power. It has created an exception which the legislature did not see
fit to make.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-SURVIVAL OF CAUSE OF ACTION
HELD MATTER OF PROCEDURE
Plaintiffs and defendant's intestate, all residents of California, were
involved in an auto collision in Arizona, the latter dying as a result of
injuries thereby sustained. After the appointment of defendant as ad-
ministrator of decedent's estate, each of the plaintiffs brought damage
actions in California, which were rejected. Separate actions were filed
against the decedent's estate, to which the defendant demurred and
moved for abatement, since the statutes of Arizona made no provision
for survival of causes of action after the death of the tortfeasor. By
statute in California, causes of action for negligent torts survive the
death of the tortfeasor, and can be maintained against the administrator
or executor of his estate.' The trial court granted motions to abate and
the appeals of plaintiffs were consolidated. The Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia reversed the lower court's decision, holding survival of a cause
of action upon death of the tortfeasor a matter of procedure and, there-
fore, governed by the law of the forum, in accordance with the rule
from conflict of laws. Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P. 2d 944
(1953).
1Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1949) § 956.
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At common law, personal rights of action abate upon the death of
the person. This is the literal meaning of the maxim: Actio personalis
moritur cum persona.2 Due to its stringency, this principle has never
been favored by the majority of American courts; exceptions were en-
grafted upon it even before statutes modifying its effects came to be
enacted.8 Due to the variation in the provisions of such statutes, it is not
feasible to generalize on the extent of such modification. Under such
statutes at the present, most states permit suits by or against the repre-
sentatives of a deceased plaintiff or tortfeasor.4 While the court in the
instant case holds to the contrary, the weight of authority in the United
States is that the question of survival depends on the law of the situs of
the wrong, i.e., the lex loci delicti.8 Thus, in Ormsby v. Chase, a leading
case, the plaintiff sustained injuries resulting from the fall of an elevator
caused by the negligence of defendant, occurring in New York. Shortly
after, the defendant died, and the plaintiff brought suit in Pensylvania
against the defendant's administrator. New York followed the common
law rule on survival. Notwithstanding Pennsylvania's statute abrogating
the common law, the United States Supreme Court held the law of the
place of the wrong controlled and the plaintiff was denied recovery. 7
By way of distinction, it is to be noted that the "revival" of an action
after the death of a party to a pending action, commenced during the
lifetime of the person in whose favor or against whom the cause accrued,
is remedial in nature and therefore determined by the law of the forum.8
Conversely, if under the law of the forum the pending action in such
instance does not abate, but survives, the action will be continued, even
though, under the lex loci, a like action there pending would have abated
by the death of the party and would not have revived.
A deviation from the general rule on survival is found in Martin v.
2 Clark v. Goodwin, 170 Cal. 527, 150 Pac. 357 (1915); Warner v. Flack, 278 111.
303, 116 N.E. 197 (1917).
3 Generally at Common Law, causes of action for injury primarily to property
and only incidentally to the person survived, whereas those primarily to the person
abated. 1 C.J.S., Abatement and Revival § VI-C (1936).
a Goodrich, Conflict of Laws § 98 (1938).
5 Orr v. Ahern, 107 Conn. 174, 139 Ad. 691 (1928); Chubbock v. Holloway, 182
Minn. 225, 234 N.W. 314 (1931); Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 67 S.W. 2d 96 (1933);
Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 166 Ati. 119 (1933); Summer v. Brown, 312
Pa. 124, 167 AtI. 315 (1933); Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 390 (1932).
6290 U.S. 387 (1933).
7 See also Stratton's Independence v. Dines, 126 Fed. 968 (C.C. Colo., 1904); Davis
v. New York & N.E. R. Co., 143 Mass. 301, 9 N.E. 815 (1887).
8 Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226 (1899); Page v. United Fruit Co., 3
F. 2d 747 (C.A. 1st, 1925).
9 Gordon v. Chicago R.I. & Pac. R. Co., 154 Iowa 449, 134 N.W. 1057 (1912).
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Wabash Railway Company,' ° and its dictum has apparently led courts
in other jurisdictions to conclude that survival should be considered a
matter of procedure and thus controlled by the law of the forum. The
Martin case was an action in a federal district court sitting in Illinois.
Plaintiff died while his action was pending for injuries he sustained in
Indiana. On these facts, it is apparent a question of abatement or revival
of a pending action was presented. The court correctly applied Illinois
law, but in the course of its opinion stated:
Whether a cause of action survives" by law is not a question of procedure,
but of right; and is determinable when the action is one arising at common
law, not by the law of the state where the injuries were inflicted, but by the
law of the state where the action is brought.12
To call either survival or revival a matter of right and then say that
it is governed by the law of the forum is a contradiction on its face.
The effect of the court's conclusion, however, was that revival was a
procedural question to be determined by the lex fori. This confusion of
the law concerning the distinct concepts of survival and revival has made
its impact on the decisions of other courts, and to a degree it would
appear to exist in the instant decision.
There exists a legitimate, though uncommon, ground upon which a
state may refuse to honor the provisions of a survival statute from a sister
state. Such occurs when the enforcement of the foreign cause of action
is contrary to the public policy of the forum. 13 So in Herzog v. Stern,14
the court refused on grounds of public policy, to permit suit against a
deceased tortfeasor's executor, even though in Virginia, where the plain-
tiff sustained the injuries, there was a survival statute.
The majority of the court in the instant case acknowledged that the
answer to the question of whether the causes survived depended upon
the application of California or Arizona law, the latter jurisdiction having
only a revival statute. Resolution of the question whether survival was
a matter of substance or procedure was held to be a matter of first im-
pression for the California courts; according to the majority, a review
of the cases in other jurisdictions produced "no compelling weight of
authority for either alternative."'15 The majority of the court decided in
favor of considering survival a matter of procedure and therefore con-
trolled by the lex fori. At this point, it is of interest to note that of the
10 142 Fed. 650 (C.A. 7th, 1905). 11 Italics added.
12 Martin v. Wabash Railway Co., 142 Fed. 650, 651 (C.A. 7th, 1905).
13 Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N.Y. 466, 3 N.E. 2d 597 (1936); Herzog v. Stem, 264 N.Y.
379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934); Texas & Pac. R. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627
(1887).
14 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934). 15 264 P. 2d 944, 949 (1953).
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cases cited by the court in support of its view, four were decided on
the question of revival of a pending action,' 6 and two held enforcement
of a survival statute from a sister state repugnant to the public policy of
the forum. 17 This line of cases would not appear to constitute authority
for holding contrary to the majority of American jurisdictions on the
question of survival, when revival is conceded by the majority to be a
matter of procedure, and no question of public policy was presented
in the instant case.
In Cort v. Steen,'8 an earlier case touching on the same problem, the
California Supreme Court held that the effect of a survival statute is to
create a right or cause of action, rather than continue an existing right
or revive or extend a remedy theretofore accrued. As the minority of
the court stated in its dissenting opinion to the instant case, the majority
view that survival is not an essential part of the cause of action, but a
matter of procedure, is hardly reconcilable with the majority opinion
in the Cort case. Added to this must be the fact that the court failed to
overrule the Cort decision in the instant case.
The majority rationalizes support for its view by reasoning from the.
premise that a statute, or other rule of law, may be characterized "as
substantive or procedural according to the nature of the problem for
which the characterization must be made."'1 Since California claimants
were seeking to enforce their claims against the estate of a California
decedent, the majority deemed the proceeding to be a matter of purely
local concern, and for this proceeding "characterized" survival as a
matter of procedure. The decision of the majority in the instant case
is thus open to the criticism of inconsistent application of the conflict of
laws rules, which have as their goal uniformity of legal determinations
no matter the forum in which recovery is sought. Unquestionably, the
plaintiffs in the instant case could not have recovered had they brought
their action to the courts of Arizona, where the wrong occurred. The
California Supreme Court, it must be remembered, did stress the local
nature of the problem due to the fact that all the parties were Cali-
fornians. Whether or not the court would have held as it did had the
plaintiffs been domiciled in Arizona is open to conjecture. Certainly the
way to a contrary holding has been left open by the court's reliance
on its "characterization" theory.
16Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226 (1899); Martin v. Baltimore &
Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673 (1894); Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa
449, 134 N.W. 1057 (1912); Austin v. Pittsburgh, C.C. & St.L. R. Co., 122 Ky. 304, 91
S.W. 742 (1906).
17Herzog v. Stern, 264 N.Y. 379, 191 N.E. 23 (1934); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887).
18 36 Cal. 2d 437, 224 P. 2d 723 (1950).
19 Grant v. McAuliffe. 41 Cal. 2d 859, 863, 264 P. 2d 944, 948 (1953).
